MARSHALL BES IN FINAL2.DOC

5/5/2009 4:13:17 PM

Responses
JUSTICES AS ECONOMIC FIXERS: A
RESPONSE TO A MACROTHEORY OF THE
COURT
SCOTT BAKER†
ADAM FEIBELMAN††
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL†††
INTRODUCTION
In Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A Macrotheory of
1
the Court (Economic Trends), Professors Thomas Brennan, Lee
Epstein, and Nancy Staudt advance a new theory of judicial
decisionmaking. They posit that Justices respond like voters to
economic conditions. In the typical recession, Justices punish bad
economic policy by deferring less to the government. In the typical
boom, Justices do the opposite; they reward the government for good
policymaking by granting more deference. The shifting nature of
deference impacts the government’s win rate before the Supreme
Court. All else equal, in a normal recession the government is more
likely to lose. In a normal boom, the government is more likely to
2
win.
The authors refine their theory so that the size of the business
cycle matters. When the recession is dramatic, Justices do not blame it
on policy shortcomings. A large recession results from unexpected
shocks, rather than misfiring government policies. And so, Justices
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1. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009).
2. Id. at 1219.
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rally around the flag and grant the government more deference
3
during unexpected economic events.
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt look for evidence to
support their theory by examining two pockets of tax cases. The first
set involves cases filed between 1912 and 1929, a time period when
the economy experienced several conventional business cycles. The
second set involves cases filed during the Great Depression, 1930 to
1940. The regression results are consistent with the theory. In the first
set of cases, the government’s win rate positively correlates with the
business cycle. It goes down in the recessions and up in the booms. In
the 1930s, the reverse occurs. The win rate increases as the depression
deepens and decreases when the economy picks up steam.
As the authors explain, Economic Trends is part of their larger
project on a macrotheory of judging that examines the effects of
4
national and local trends on judicial decisionmaking. The project is
extraordinarily creative and merits serious engagement and
discussion. We begin that dialogue here.
We start, however, with one caveat. In the pages that follow, we
focus only on the authors’ conclusions regarding judicial behavior in
typical economic upturns and downturns and do not address their
review of court actions in times of severe economic crises. We do so
because there is already a significant body of scholarship that suggests
that courts behave differently in times of profound national trauma
5
such as war. It is consistent with this literature to learn that courts
have similar “rally around the flag” reactions in economic
6
emergencies. The authors’ finding that typical economic cycles also
3. See id. (“In ‘atypical times,’ when the economy moves into a state of crisis, the Justices
do not adopt the role of a disciplinarian but seek to support the government in an effort to help
return the economy to a state of growth and stability.”).
4. Id. at 1191.
5. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (Vintage Books 2000) (1998) (examining how the courts have treated
civil liberty issues arising in times of war from the 1860s to the 1940s); GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR
ON TERRORISM (2004) (investigating how civil liberties are compromised in wartime); Eric L.
Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)) (critiquing Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s book for downplaying the severity of rights deprivation in times of war and
expanding upon some of Rehnquist’s examples).
6. The question whether emergency conditions should influence judicial decisionmaking
has also received significant scholarly attention. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1043–45 (2004) (proposing a framework to be utilized in states
of emergency that would prevent the “normalization of emergency conditions” whereby the
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affect how Justices decide cases is, therefore, the more intriguing
aspect of the analysis.
Our Response proceeds in three Parts. Part I unpacks the
theoretical model. The authors’ regression results are consistent with
three different motivating models. First, it could be that the Justices,
like voters, act reflexively. They get angry at the government in a
recession and pleased in a boom, and they express these emotions in
7
the votes they cast. Under this model, the Justices, like a single voter
in a national election, do not act because they necessarily believe
their votes will actually affect policymaking. Rather, they use their
vote to reflect their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
government. We refer to this as the reflexive model.
Second, it might be that the Justices are using their votes to
generally encourage good policymaking and discourage bad
policymaking at the margin by deferring to or rejecting the
government position based on economic conditions. This model
differs from the reflexive model in that the Justices are attempting to
8
use their votes to actively attempt to influence government policy. It
is similar to the reflexive model, however, in that the Justices’ actions
are based on their reactions to general economic conditions and not
on case-specific assessments as to the economic wisdom or effect of
the particular tax provision at issue in the case before them. Simply
stated, under this model, the Court treats the specific tax issue in the
case as, in effect, a proxy for the government’s economic policies
generally. The Justices assess the competence of these policies by the
conditions observed at oral argument. We denote this as the
untargeted-incentive model.
Third, the model might be that the Justices assess the economic
effects of the specific tax provision under review by examining
economic conditions at oral argument. Then, the Justices decide
cases, at least in part, based on these economic effects. Thus, they will

judiciary creates an environment perpetually conducive to the widespread adoption of
“oppressive measures”).
7. See Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1197–98 (“Our account, thus, indicates that Justices
act like voters during election cycles. Just as voters take cues from the economy, attributing
good economic times to effective policymaking in the elected branches of government and
(most) bad economic times to government incompetence, so do the Justices.”).
8. Id. at 1203 (“If the Justices believe that Congress and the president are shirking their
management responsibilities for, say, political gain, and that this shirking has negatively affected
the economy, then it is entirely rational for the Justices to punish this behavior in an effort to
encourage policymakers to act in the best interests of the nation.”).
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reject the government’s tax position in the case at hand if they
perceive it to be harmful to the economy and will accept it if they
9
believe it to be beneficial. As such, they create incentives for
adopting tax policy that contribute to economic prosperity. We call
this the targeted-incentive model.
The implications of the empirical results depend on which model
is being tested. If the Justices are expressing emotional gut reactions
to economic conditions, as the reflexive model would have it, there
should be a deference effect in every case with the government as a
litigant, not just tax cases. If the Justices are trying to actually
influence the government’s overall economic policies by how they
rule on tax cases, as the untargeted-incentive model suggests, there
should be some indication of that purpose in the opinions. If the
Justices are trying to promote better policymaking in tax cases, as in
the targeted-incentive model, then the likelihood the tax policy at
issue will have an observable effect on the business cycle and, if so,
the precise lag of that effect become increasingly important.
With these three models in hand, Part II comments on the
authors’ statistical analysis and suggests ways to potentially increase
the robustness of the results. Part III discusses the normative
implications of the authors’ study. We ask in that Part if the judicial
behavior described in any or all of these models constitutes good
judging, a healthy jurisprudence. We conclude that it does not.
I. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
A. The Reflexive-Voting Model
Under the reflexive-voting model, the Justices reflect their
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with economic conditions through the
votes they cast in tax cases. This theory is akin to an expressive model
of voting behavior. The chance that a single vote will turn an election
10
is close to zero. So, the rational voters do not believe that their vote
9. Id. (“Instead, we argue that Justices may view their ability to refuse to implement
flawed policies and programs as a way to encourage better economic management in the elected
branches of government at the margin. More importantly, we posit that judicial refusal to
implement perceived policy failures could work to limit possible damage to the economy,
thereby advancing the interests of the Justices.”).
10. Dr. Anthony Downs wrote the seminal work on this well-known paradox of voting. See
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); see also William H. Riker
& Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 25 (1968)
(“We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote
to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so.”).
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could actually be determinative in influencing policy. The voter,
nevertheless, exercises the franchise to send a message of approval or
11
frustration to the governing entities. And the evidence suggests that
voters, as a whole, tend to vote to cast politicians out in a recession
12
and reelect in an expansion.
The statistically significant results that Economic Trends
uncovers are consistent with, and are plausibly explained by, Justices
expressing their approval or disapproval of government through their
voting behavior. Justices’ moods change with the economic
conditions, and perhaps without even knowing it, they take out these
emotions on the government. That is a potentially important takehome point of the regressions because it is so different from the
standard story of judicial behavior.
As such, the reflexive-voting account stands in contrast to the
strategic models of judicial behavior that posit far more deliberate
13
judicial behavior. Yet it rings true. Why would Justices be immune

11. Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 10, at 28 (including “the satisfaction from affirming a
partisan preference” among the utility benefits that a prospective voter may consider when
determining whether to cast a solitary ballot).
12. See Gianluigi Galeotti & Antonio Forcina, Political Loyalties and the Economy: The
U.S. Case, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511, 516 (1989) (finding that, in times of economic turmoil,
Democratic voters remain steadfastly loyal to their party to a greater extent than do Republican
voters); Gerald H. Kramer, Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964, 65 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 131, 140–41 (1971) (“Economic fluctuations, in particular, are important
influences on congressional elections, with economic upturn helping the congressional
candidates of the incumbent party, and economic decline benefiting the opposition.”); Joseph P.
McGarrity, Macroeconomic Conditions and Committee Re-election Rates, 124 PUB. CHOICE 453,
472 (2005) (“[E]conomic conditions influence the probability of reelection for members on
committees that manage the economy or provide a public good.”). But see William Levernier,
The Effect of Relative Economic Performance on the Outcome of Gubernational Elections, 74
PUB. CHOICE 181, 182 (1992) (finding that, in gubernatorial elections, “economic conditions
have only a minor effect on the share of the vote received by the incumbent party”).
13. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE passim (1998);
THOMAS H. HAMMOND, CHRIS W. BONNEAU & REGINALD S. SHEEHAN, STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 65–238 (2005); RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 29–31 (2008); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 97–109 (2002); Andrew F.
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and
Discretionary Review, 14 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006) (exploring the conditions
under which dissenting appellate court judges become increasingly likely to “promote a case for
review” by a supreme court); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 373–74 (1991) (finding discernible preferences
reflected in the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation); Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, How
a Judge Thinks, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 105, 107–09, on file with
the Duke Law Journal); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. CONTEMP.
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from the pressure to release frustration at government policy during a
recession? The model raises the some interesting questions: Are
Justices more like knee-jerk voters or savvy strategic players, as the
bulk of the literature suggests? Can Justices be both simultaneously?
If reflexive voting is largely subconscious, are there other
subconscious factors, such as latent hostility to, say, certain types of
14
litigants, that also drive outcomes?
B. The Untargeted-Incentive Model
The untargeted-incentive model suggests that Justices intend to
affect overall government economic policy through tax rulings. By
deferring to the government when times are good and not when times
are bad, the Court can provide incentives for the adoption of more
effective economic policies.
Notably, this model does not suggest that the Justices consider
the economic pros and cons of the particular tax issue before them on
review. Rather, the model works in the aggregate. All government
positions in tax cases are treated as bad during recessions and as good
during upturns. Thus, in a downturn, the Court is less likely to defer
to the government in a tax case even when the government’s position
is economically sensible and, conversely, in an upturn the Court is
more likely to defer to the government even when the government’s
position is economically flawed.
Although this behavior might seem counterproductive at one
level, it is explicable. Because the Justices do not have the economic
expertise to determine which government policies are economically
sound and which are economically weak, they can only respond to
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (2006) (explaining how positive political theorists generate models to predict
“the outcome of the lawmaking game”).
14. This point relates to work on how social background affects judicial decisionmaking.
See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges’ Attributes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative
Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277, 280 (1988)
(exploring the distinct predictive impact of various background characteristics on judicial voting
behavior in equal protection cases); James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt,
Judicial Hostility Towards Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a
Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1682–85 (1999) (detailing the concerns raised by
detractors of the “social background” approach to analyzing judges’ behavior); Tracey E.
George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1333, 1349–56 (2008) (exploring the movement to analyze judicial behavior in light of the
salient characteristics of judges’ lives present before their ascent to the bench); C. Neal Tate &
Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme
Court Voting Behavior, 1916–88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460, 478 (1991) (devising “personal
attributes models for Supreme Court justice voting behavior”).
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economic conditions with a broad brush. Thus, if the Justices believe
that they should “mitigate the impact of bad policy choices through
the judicial process [so that] Congress and the president will be less
15
likely to make bad economic decisions in the future,” it is plausible
they would do so by reacting to economic conditions generally and
not by calibrating their actions to the economic merits of the specific
issue before them.
We are skeptical, however, that even the savviest of Justices
looking to influence macroeconomic policy would actually decide
cases in this manner.
First, for this punishment-reward scheme to work, government
officials would have to know about it. Yet we are unaware of an
opinion that references economic conditions during oral argument as
a relevant factor in the decision. Sure, the Justices might not be
transparent. Like an attitudinalist Justice, they might not want to be
16
seen as deciding a case based on anything other than the “law.” But
unlike Justices seeking to impose their policy preferences, Justices
hoping to alter government policymaking would not want to hide
their pleasure or disappointment with the government. Instead,
Justices hoping to alter government policymaking would want the
government to know that they were going to lose during a recession
and win during a boom so the government could remedy its actions
accordingly. And, presumably, those Justices would indicate as much
in the opinion.
Second, a Justice’s belief that shifting levels of deference in tax
cases would, in fact, induce government officials to engage in better
overall economic policymaking is unrealistic. There are far more
powerful political pressures placed on elected officials than decisions
of the Supreme Court. The fact that government officials are more
likely to be reelected in a boom and ousted during a recession is a
powerful incentive for those officials to try to improve the economy.
Additionally, tax revenues go up in booms and down in recessions,
meaning government officials have more resources to devote to
favored policy initiatives in times of economic prosperity. Simply put,
regardless of what the Court does, government officials will want to
17
dampen a recession and prolong a boom.

15. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1201.
16. POSNER, supra note 13, at 252–53.
17. The model also treats the government as a single actor. The same entity that litigates
conducts the macroeconomic policymaking. It is not clear why, for example, the Federal
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Third, a Justice’s decision to level untargeted incentives against
the government must be made on the margin. The elected officials’
behavior is already subject to strong incentives. The question for the
Justice is what additional motivation will shifting deference bring.
The marginal benefit in terms of better policy is likely to be small. If
such actions have any cost, the rational Justice would not do it. And
there could be costs.
For one, such a move might provoke a public backlash against
the Court, with the political actors asserting that the Court is deciding
cases on illegitimate grounds. The executive might argue that the
Court is meddling in macroeconomic policymaking and, as such,
extending its influence too far.
A second cost to a Justice involves the sacrifice of other values.
Take a Justice who harbors a policy preference: she prefers tax policy
18
that favors the poor. The same Justice cares about better economic
policymaking. A case comes before the Court in a recession. Suppose
that to satisfy her preference for the poor, the Justice would want to
rule in favor of the government. To motivate better overall economic
policymaking, however, the Justice would want to rule against the
government. The cost to creating untargeted incentives is forgoing the
chance to help poor people. This sacrifice will not be worthwhile if
the untargeted incentives fail to provide much in the way of
incentives for better policymaking.
C. The Targeted-Incentive Model
The targeted-incentive model posits that the Justices take
economic success or failure into account when they adjudicate tax
issues. Justices lack economic expertise. Therefore, they use the
conditions at oral argument as a rough proxy for whether a tax policy
had a good or bad effect. Under this model, the Court defers to the
government’s tax positions that have beneficial economic
consequences and does not defer to the government when the latter’s
position is economically detrimental.

Reserve chair would care or know about shifting deference in tax cases before the Supreme
Court. If the chair does not care, it is unclear why the deference scheme would alter decisions
regarding monetary policy.
18. The question of whether a judge should decide cases based on policy preferences is
another matter. Our point here is that only deciding cases based on economic conditions may
interfere with a judge’s own jurisprudential approach.
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Certainly this is a plausible account of judicial decisionmaking.
Justices regularly take broad consequences into consideration when
deciding cases. And they might be particularly attuned to the
economic implications of their decisions when cases come before
them during economic upturns or downturns. Further, the fact that
the Court rejects the government’s position more frequently in times
of recessions than in times of boom may reflect that the bad economic
consequences of particular government positions may be more
apparent during downtimes than in upturns.
Nevertheless, we are unsure if this model explains the authors’
findings. First, the study reviews all tax cases, not just cases in which a
Justice could reasonably assume that the tax question at issue would
have any economic impact whatsoever, much less be a contributing
factor to the business cycle. The Court’s decision in United States v.
19
Shelley, for example, which held that mixing smoking opium with the
residue of opium that had been smoked should not be treated as the
manufacture of opium under the tax laws, does not address a matter
20
of broad economic import. Similarly, the question addressed in
21
United States v. Whitridge, whether or not receivership income
22
should be subject to the corporate income tax, is unlikely to have
significant and observable effects on economic upturns or downturns.
Therefore, it is difficult to see how the Court’s decisions ruling against
the government in cases like Shelley and Whitridge, in which the tax
issues in question are relatively insular, could be seen as an effort to
refuse “to implement perceived policy failures [so as to] to limit
23
possible damage to the economy.” Why would a rational Justice use
a business cycle proxy to assess the success or failure of the
government’s positions at issue in Shelley and Whitridge?
Second, the study itself does not code between economically
sound and economically flawed governmental positions in the tax
cases collected. Instead, it posits that Justices think a tax policy is
flawed if, at oral argument, the economy is in recession, and they
think a tax policy is economically sound if, at oral argument, the
economy is in a boom. Indeed the major insight of Economic Trends
19. United States v. Shelley, 229 U.S. 239 (1913).
20. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1209–10 (indicating that the authors compiled their
dataset by conducting a Lexis search on the word “tax” for cases decided between 1913 and
1940 and retained cases that involved the Justices’ interpretation of a tax statute).
21. United States v. Whitridge, 231 U.S. 144 (1913).
22. Id. at 149.
23. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1203.

MARSHALL BES IN FINAL2.DOC

1636

5/5/2009 4:13:17 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1627

is that the Court’s decisions in tax cases are broadly based reactions
to economic conditions and not finely calibrated responses to
particular governmental initiatives.
As such, however, the targeted-incentive model raises many of
the same problems as the untargeted-incentive model. After all, if the
Court has never said it would assess the strength of a tax case by
reference to economic conditions at oral argument, it is difficult to
believe that it would use that indicia to achieve its presumed targeting
goals. Even assuming that (1) the government could be motivated to
make better tax policy by shifting Court deference and (2) better
policymaking in certain tax cases would ultimately show up in the
business cycle, those results cannot accrue unless the government
knows about the incentive scheme. Accordingly, if the Justices
wanted to provide these incentives they would have to have said so in
the opinions.
Third, as will be discussed in the next Part, the targeted-incentive
model raises timing problems regarding the case samples in the
24
study. If the Court is looking at the economic effect of a tax
provision, it is not clear that it would be concerned with the economic
conditions at the time of oral argument rather than the economic
conditions surrounding the time the position was adopted.
II. THOUGHTS ON STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
The statistical analysis in Economic Trends is carefully
constructed and the authors should be commended for their skill and
creativity in compiling their results and for their refreshing candor in
acknowledging the limitations of the data. We do, however, in this
Part, suggest two areas in which the robustness of the statistical
results might be improved. First, Part II.A considers issues of timing
and case selection in the sample. The authors focus on economic
conditions at the time of oral argument in coding the sampled cases,
but to us, it makes a significant difference as to which theoretical
model the authors are testing for that time to be the relevant factor.
Second, Part II.B discusses the unrelated selection bias problem
identified by the authors: the idea that the cases litigated before the
Supreme Court in times of economic booms might not have the same
characteristics as cases litigated before the Court in time of economic

24. See infra Part II.A.
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busts. In that Section we suggest some alternative ways to deal with
this issue.
A. Timing Issues
Economic Trends posits that the economic conditions on the date
of oral argument trigger the Court’s response. The authors’ choice of
oral argument as the key date for measuring economic conditions
makes sense under the reflexive and untargeted-incentive models.
There, the Court does not specifically consider the economic policy
implications of the tax issue before it. The Court simply rewards or
penalizes the government irrespective of the actual policies at issue in
25
the case.
The authors’ choice of oral argument as the appropriate date to
measure economic conditions does not as readily comport with the
targeted-incentive model, however. Assume that the there is an
economic downturn at oral argument. The authors’ theory posits that
the Court would be less likely to defer to the government because the
Court would assume that the fact there was an economic downturn at
the time of oral argument meant that the government’s policy had a
bad economic effect.
One concern with this analysis is that it assumes the Justices
would ignore whether the policy at issue actually helped precipitate
the economic downturn. It may be, for example, that the government
made its taxation decision during an uptick in the economy and its
impact on the business cycle, if any, enhanced the existing boom. In
that case, the Justices should be granting the government more
deference (the policy worked, after all), even though after working its
way through the system the case ended up on the docket during a
recession.
The targeted-incentive model thus presumes two propositions.
First, as noted above, it assumes that the tax policy at issue had an
economic effect which would show up in the business cycle. Second, it

25. The only difference between the reflexive and untargeted-incentive models in this
respect is that whereas under the reflexive model the Court’s action simply expresses a message
of approval or disapproval, the Court’s action under the untargeted incentive is to encourage
the government to engage in better policymaking across the board. The expressive model has
consequences, of course. Litigants win or lose; the law is changed. Under the expressive model,
the Justices do not anticipate that these consequences will impact overall macroeconomic
policy.
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assumes that the lag in the economic effect coincides with the date of
oral argument.
Consider again United States v. Whitridge. As noted, the issue in
Whitridge was whether receivership income was subject to the
26
corporate income tax. In 1908, the assets of a few distressed street
railways in New York City had been placed in receivership. The
receiver’s job, as articulated by the appointing court, was “to run,
manage, and operate said railroads and properties, to collect the
rents, income, tolls, issues, and profits of said railroad and property,
to exercise the authority and franchises of said defendant, and
27
discharge its public duties.” The case was consolidated with a second
28
distressed railway case. In 1911, the government filed a petition
demanding that the receivers declare the net income of the railway
29
corporations as income for corporation tax law purposes. The
receivers balked, claiming they managed the assets as officers of the
30
31
court, not as the directors and officers of the corporations. In 1912,
the district court ruled for the receivers. The court of appeals
affirmed, and the government appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court heard oral argument on October 21, 1913 and ruled
32
against the government on November 10, 1913.
In evaluating the economic impact of the decision to tax
receivership income, the relevant macroeconomic data are likely to
be what was happening in 1911, shortly after the decision was made,
not what was happening at oral argument in 1913. Moreover, in 1912,
the lower court invalidated the taxation decision, dampening, if not
eliminating, any economic effects of that initial decision that might be
felt in 1913.
Even in cases where the lower court upholds the government’s
tax decision, the only way the assumption of the oral argument
marker makes sense is if the lag in the effect of the taxation decision
tracks the time it takes for the case to reach the oral argument stage
at the U.S. Supreme Court. But why would this be so?

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Whitridge, 231 U.S. at 144.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 144.
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All this is to say that timing can be important. One coding
question then leaps to mind: are economic conditions at oral
argument the relevant markers for determining whether the Court is,
in fact, actually reacting to the economic impact of the government’s
tax decisions in deciding tax cases?
B. Selection Effects
In normal times the data reveal a positive correlation between
economic conditions and government win rates. For the data to be
consistent with any of the models, the only difference between a
boom and bust must be the Justices’ perception of the government as
a litigant. The theory requires that the Justices consider the same
cases independent of the economic climate. The cases must have the
same merits; they must be litigated with the same vigor; and the
settlement behavior of all affected parties must be similar. If not, the
relationship might be the result of the appeal of different cases, rather
than the same type of cases being adjudicated differently. The
government, for example, might bring more legally questionable tax
cases in a recession because it needs the revenue. Or the government
might devote fewer resources to litigating cases in a recession because
of a tighter budget constraint. Either way, the relationship between
win rates and the trough of the business cycle reflects something
special about the cases the Court considered at that time, rather than
the punishment of bad policymaking or knee-jerk expressive
33
reactions. Disentangling the two explanations is dicey. The authors
34
assume that selection effects are not driving the results. As
commentators, we wanted to offer some constructive suggestions for
checking the validity of this assumption.
To tease out the effects, the authors first might consider
unexpected shocks to output. By definition, litigants cannot anticipate
an unexpected shock. As a result, unexpected changes in economic
conditions should not change the kinds of tax cases the government
appeals. But the Court’s perception of those cases will change. The
Court observes the unexpected shock and then decides whether to
punish or not. A relationship between win rates and unexpected

33. For a discussion of the statistical consequences of selection bias, see WILLIAM H.
GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 926–34 (4th ed. 2000).
34. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1194–95 (describing the authors’ theory that Justices
respond to economic prosperity or downturns by expressing support or disapproval for
government management, but not addressing selection effects).
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shocks would suggest that the Justices’ perceptions—rather than
differing attributes of the cases being reviewed—are the driving
factor.
The literature on economic forecasting is massive and
35
sophisticated. We do not delve into the details here. One simple way
to uncover unexpected changes in output is this: use the simplest
36
forecasting model. Suppose that industrial production in period t is a
linear function of industrial productions in the prior periods.
Compare the forecasted industrial production in period t with the
actual industrial production in period t. The difference is one measure
of the unexpected change in production that period. The authors
might then regress the unexpected change in output occurring on or
around the date of oral argument against the government win rates
and see what happens.
Alternatively, the authors might consider using changes in
industrial production between the grant of certiorari and the oral
argument as the core variable. The Court normally grants certiorari a
few months before oral argument. After certiorari has been granted,
the appeal has already happened. And so, the concern that the
government pursues legally suspect cases in a recession and slam
dunk cases in a boom dissipates. The only thing changing is the
economic condition between the certiorari date and the oral
argument.
This second approach is not a perfect fix, however. The
government might litigate the same case differently depending on the
economic climate, especially if the budget impacts the resources the
government can devote to pursuing appeals.
III. JUSTICES AS ECONOMIC FIXERS
Economic Trends describes judicial behavior; it does not critique
it. But the normative aspects of the judicial behavior depicted are as
intriguing as the behavior itself. We therefore offer some preliminary
observations on this issue.
Our reaction, of course, depends in large measure on the nature
of the judicial behavior one thinks the study depicts. If the implication

35. For an overview on economic forecasting, see generally PETER ABELSON & ROSELYNE
JOYEUX, ECONOMIC FORECASTING (2000); NICOLAS CARNOT, VINCENT KOEN & BRUNO
TISSOT, ECONOMIC FORECASTING (2005).
36. On this simple model, see JAMES D. HAMILTON, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 72–77 (1994).

MARSHALL BES IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

JUSTICES AS ECONOMIC FIXERS

5/5/2009 4:13:17 PM

1641

of the study is that Justices subconsciously take economic conditions
into account when deciding cases, then the Justices can be criticized
for not being appropriately self-aware to correct against their
37
intuitions. Indeed, if subconscious behavior explains the results
captured in Economic Trends, one of the article’s most significant
contributions is that it will alert sitting judges to be aware of and
38
guard against such reactions in future cases.
If the claim, however, is that Justices intentionally rule for or
against the government in tax cases based on economic conditions
unrelated to the legal merits of the case, the normative implications of
the study are far more serious. Consider the untargeted-incentive
model. Although, under this model, the Justices may be acting with
an understandable desire to encourage the government to improve
the economy, it is troublesome to think that they would do so by
deciding cases based on economic conditions unrelated to the merits
of the legal issue before them. They have no constitutional authority
to act in this manner. Courts, after all, decide cases, not economic
policy. Indeed, if, as the Supreme Court has explained, “courts are
not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of
39
the Nation’s laws,” they can hardly be considered roving
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the Nation’s economy.
The judicial behavior described in both the untargeted-incentive
and reflexive models is also problematic for other reasons. First, the
public’s faith in the Supreme Court (or any court for that matter)
depends on a consistent application of law to facts. Consequently, if
Justices deliberately choose not to decide like cases alike simply
because of extraneous economic conditions, they risk violating that
faith and damaging their own credibility. Justices, like voters, may
react to economic conditions, but they are not empowered to make

37. There is a growing body of literature on debiasing judges and the relative strengths of
various debiasing strategies, though this literature generally focuses on addressing the effects of
cognitive biases. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199 passim (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 586–88 (1998); Neil D. Weinstein & William M.
Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313, 313–23 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). A groundbreaking work in this field was Baruch
Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422, 422–
44 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
38. One judge on the panel at the Symposium praised the study for this exact reason.
39. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–11 (1973) (discussing why the
application of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine should be limited).
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judicial decisions based on those factors. In a world of judicial review
and life tenure, it is unsettling that Justices would choose the outcome
based on a knee-jerk response to economic conditions, rather than a
careful consideration of the consequences of alternative rulings
specific to that case. (This is not to say that such judicial behavior
does not occur. Justice Douglas, for example, was seriously criticized
for reflexively voting against the government in tax cases because of
40
his purported dislike of the Internal Revenue Service.)
Second, the untargeted-incentive and reflexive-voting models
lead to instability in the law, which poses significant costs. Parties lose
the ability to structure their transactions when the law lacks
predictability, which would be the case if legal interpretation was tied
to economic conditions. The lack of predictability also discourages
41
settlement. In deciding whether to appeal a case—in candidly
assessing the legal merits—lawyers would have to engage in economic
forecasting, trying to pin down the likely dip or uptick in the economy
around oral argument. Few lawyers would be able to do this
successfully.
Third, these models may simply lead to bad results. As we have
seen, under both the untargeted-incentive and reflexive models,
Justices may reject a sound governmental economic position if the
case serendipitously happens to come before the Court in an
economic downturn, and the Court may uphold flawed economic
policies if those positions are reviewed in good times. The end result
is a jumbled jurisprudence with no legal coherence because neither
legal doctrine nor sound policy ties cases together.
The behavior under the targeted-incentive model is normatively
more defensible. If the Court determines that a government position
fosters economic weakness, it can take that into consideration in
reviewing the legality of that position.
40. See Bernard Wolfman, Jonathan L.F. Silver & Marjorie A. Silver, The Behavior of
Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 270–76 (1973).
41. See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of
Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1852 (2006) (“If the point of
clear legal rules is to allow the expectations of parties to settle, then private ordering is
compromised to the extent that imprecise legal rules defeat the needed predictability for parties
to make informed assessments of their rights and responsibilities.”). But see Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 573 n.35 (1992) (“The
likelihood of litigation rather than settlement may also be affected [by the choice of rules versus
standards]. Lower litigation costs make litigation more likely under rules, but the greater
predictability of outcomes makes litigation less likely.”). On settlement, see generally George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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But there are normative problems inherent in this model as well.
The first is transparency. If the Court is using this model it should
explain itself accordingly. Second, and relatedly, is lack of notice to
the litigants. For this model to work, the litigants would need to be
aware that economic effects will drive the Court’s decisions so they
can brief and analyze the legal issue in question from an economic
perspective. Moreover, because the triggering time to adjudge the
economic viability is oral argument, the litigants would have to
speculate as to what the economic conditions will be at oral argument
when they first seek certiorari and then again when they write their
merits briefs.
Even with transparency, the effect of the Court’s choosing to
view the economic success or failure of the government’s position by
referencing the state of the economy at the time of oral argument
may lead to only short-term, rather than long-term, economic gains.
Assuming it works at all, it encourages the government to tie tax
policy to the business cycle rather than long-term growth. Finally,
using the timing of oral argument as the key point to proxy the
economic success of a government position is a bad idea, especially if
the tax policy at issue is unlikely to have played any observable role
in the business cycle.
CONCLUSION
Economic Trends offers a unique and novel perspective on
judicial behavior. The regressions are especially interesting because
they find a significant relationship between economic conditions and
vote outcomes. Why is that so? Assuming the statistical results are
robust, we find the most theoretically plausible explanation to be that
Justices subconsciously let their mood relating to the economic
climate bleed into their decisionmaking. If this is true, the same
deference effect should arise across many areas of law and time
periods. We are curious whether the same sorts of effects would be
found elsewhere and hope the study, like the first empirical tests of
the attitudinal model, stimulate new research on these questions.
Alternatively, the study could be read to suggest that Justices are
intentionally attempting to use judicial power to fix economic
conditions. If so, it suggests that Justices are acting both beyond their
constitutional powers and their economic expertise. As such, the
judiciary should be broadly criticized for this behavior.
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Finally, this work represents a place where the rising barrier
42
between the judiciary and the legal academy should be crossed.
Judges need to know about this study because it can alert them to
their own subconscious motivations. The next time a case comes up in
a recession, the judges can then make an affirmative effort to stifle
their anger at government mismanagement and instead pay closer
attention to the arguments made and the consequences of the
decision.

42. A number of judges have articulated this concern. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards,
Reflections (On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, and My Alma Mater), 100 MICH.
L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2002) (“The most serious concern that I have with legal scholarship is that
too much of it is useless.”); Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914–2007),
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 435 (2007) (“What has happened since the 1960s . . . is the growing
apart, especially but not only at the elite law schools, of the lawyer and the judge on the one
hand and the law professor on the other hand.”).

